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Public Goods? Policy Communities, External 
Shocks and Ideas in China’s Rural Social 
Policy Making
JANE DUCKETT & GUOHUI WANG
Abstract
Recent research on authoritarian regimes argues that they provide public goods in order to prevent rebellion. 
This essay shows that the ‘threat of rebellion’ alone cannot explain Chinese party-state policies to extend public 
goods to rural residents in the first decade of the twenty-first century. Drawing on theories of policy making, 
it argues that China’s one-party regime extended public goods to the rural population under the influence of 
ideas and policy options generated by policy communities of officials, researchers, international organisations 
and other actors. The party-state centre adopted and implemented these ideas and policy options when they 
provided solutions to external shocks and supported economic development goals. Explanations of policies 
and their outcomes in authoritarian political systems need to include not only ‘dictators’ but also other actors, 
and the ideas they generate.
WHY DO AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES PROVIDE PUBLIC GOODS? MUCH research portrays autocrats 
as focussed on maximising their own revenues (Niskanen 1997; Acemoglu & Robinson 
2000). It expects them to channel private goods to members of their support base in the 
‘selectorate’, but to neglect the ‘unenfranchised’ majority (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003).1 
Other recent studies have found authoritarian regimes sometimes do extend provision 
beyond their immediate support base—but only to groups who threaten rebellion. Gandhi 
and Przeworski (2006), for example, argue that well institutionalised one-party regimes make 
policy concessions so as to co-opt those who might otherwise challenge them. Gallagher and 
Hanson (2009) similarly suggest authoritarian regimes sometimes try to reduce revolutionary 
 
1We do not have the space here to discuss the substantial literature categorising authoritarian regimes (Linz 
2000), explaining their transitions to democracy (O’Donnell et al. 1986) and examining how they repress their 
opponents (Lichbach 1995; Wintrobe 1998).
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threats by offering ‘carrots’—and they use as an example the Chinese party-state’s provision 
of social insurance in the late 1990s to urban workers.2
In the first decade of the twenty-first century, however, China’s one-party state adopted a 
series of policies aimed at providing support to people in ill health and old age, primarily in the 
countryside. But China’s rural residents are not part of the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP’s) 
‘winning coalition’ or ‘selectorate’. Indeed, they have long been seen as the most politically 
marginalised and disadvantaged by the economic and social policies of the People’s Republic 
of China (PRC). Despite the CCP’s revolutionary rural heritage, after it seized power in 1949 
it ‘squeezed’ agriculture (buying rural goods at low prices to provide cheap food in the cities 
and fund industrialisation), and it failed to provide rural dwellers with the public housing, 
assistance with medical expenses and pensions accorded to many urban families. Although 
land reform reduced inequalities within rural areas, and communes provided some security 
and public goods, provision was much less generous in the countryside than in the cities. 
Even when Mao Zedong called for greater focus on rural areas from the late 1950s through 
the late 1970s (and initiated rural cooperative medical schemes, for example), government 
spending on officials and urban workers far exceeded that on farmers. Then in the post-Mao 
period, the party-state taxed farmers highly in comparison with urban wage earners, and new 
social programmes—minimum livelihood guarantees, re-employment training, unemployment 
insurance, and then reform of old-age and health insurance—prioritised urban officials and 
formal sector workers but neglected farmers (Solinger 2001; Duckett & Hussain 2008; Frazier 
2010).
What, then, changed into the twenty-first century to lead the Chinese party-state to extend 
public goods to the countryside? Expert observers of the period did not consider rural dwellers 
a threat to the Chinese party-state, even if their protests were increasing (O’Brien 2009, 
pp. 25–9; Saich 2014). We therefore take a bottom-up approach and examine the drivers of 
China’s twenty-first century rural social policies. Policy analysis has shown that in democratic 
political systems policies are shaped not just by leading politicians or policy makers, but 
also sometimes by communities or networks of actors (bureaucrats, researchers, activists, 
journalists and non-governmental organisations) or individual policy entrepreneurs.3 Political 
institutions also play a role, for example by giving certain actors access to influence, or by 
creating veto points where policies can be blocked (Weaver & Rockman 1993; John 2012), 
while external shocks or ‘focussing events’ are seen as the main catalysts for policy change 
(Baumgartner & Jones 1993; Kingdon 2003). Ideas can also play a role, as policy actors 
interpret shocks, evaluate evidence, invoke values and articulate preferences (Majone 1989; 
Hall 1993; Béland and Cox 2011).
Drawing on this policy analysis research we adopted an analytical framework to guide 
our investigation of the factors that have shaped China’s twenty-first century rural public 
goods provision. Thus we tried to identify key actors, political institutions, external shocks 
and ideas that shaped specific policies. Although most policy analysis research has focussed 
on democratic political systems in Europe and North America, its findings are relevant to 
authoritarian systems. Much authoritarian policy making will involve not just ‘dictators’ but 
 
2We use the term ‘party-state’ because the CCP penetrates government and other state institutions so 
thoroughly.
 
3For overviews of the many studies on policy communities, networks and actors, see John (2012) and 
Parsons (1995). We use ‘policy community’ in this essay to refer to bureaucratic and non-bureaucratic actors 
who interact in particular policy spheres to influence policy options and decisions (John 2012, pp. 61–2).
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other actors, even if top leaders have ultimate decision-making power. Political institutions 
may work differently, but they still shape access to policy influence, and not only electoral 
institutions are important. Finally, policy actors in authoritarian regimes are potentially just 
as susceptible as their counterparts in democracies to the influence of contingent external 
shocks and to the complex mix and flow of ideas around them.
Certainly, research on China has already shown that not only top leaders but also ministries 
and provincial level governments, and institutions such as bureaucratic rank, can shape policy 
(Lieberthal & Oksenberg 1988).4 The Chinese political system consists of a sophisticated array 
of integrated CCP and government organisations that radiate out from the political centre in 
Beijing to govern one fifth of the world’s population. The CCP centre consists of not only the 
Party General Secretary—its top leader—but also between four and eight others (it has varied) 
in the Politburo Standing Committee (zhengzhiju changwuhui—PBSC) and about another 
18 in the wider Politburo (zhengzhiju—PB). While the PB and PBSC meet frequently, some 
decisions are also approved by the less frequent gatherings of the CCP Central Committee 
(Zhonggong zhongyang weiyuanhui—CCPCC) of around 200. One member of the PBSC is 
Premier and head of the State Council (guowuyuan—SC, effectively the ‘cabinet’), made up 
of (currently) 23 government ministries and commissions that in turn have agencies in every 
province, city and county.5 Other PBSC members and Vice-Premiers coordinate broad policy 
across ministerial spheres of responsibility (Hamrin 1992).
China’s top leaders are extremely powerful in this centralised system. The Party General 
Secretary and members of the PBSC set the overall direction of policy making and determining 
key priorities as set out in China’s overarching five year plans and annual government plans. 
Under Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao (2002–2012), for whom ‘scientific development’ was a key 
slogan, scholars and other experts were invited to present their work directly at PB ‘Study 
Sessions’ (A. Miller 2015). More routinely, however, the central party-state uses sophisticated 
bureaucratic arrangements that funnel upwards information and intra-ministerial expertise, 
external advice (from scholars, think tanks, lower levels of the party-state and the media), 
policy options and feedback from policy experimentation (Heilmann 2008; Mertha 2009).
In this context our essay focuses on the Chinese government’s policies to abolish agricultural 
tax and extend programmes of public provision—rural cooperative medical schemes and new 
rural pensions—in the first decade of the twenty-first century. These three policies aimed to 
reduce the tax burden on farmers and deliver to all rural dwellers financial help with medical 
expenses and basic pensions. Despite their limitations they may have begun to bridge the 
longstanding divide in the state’s treatment of urban and rural dwellers. We chose these 
policies because they targeted some of the most marginalised in Chinese society—poor, sick 
and elderly rural residents. They not only benefited a large number of people, they—especially 
the medical schemes and pensions—constitute ‘tough cases’ because they provide for those 
who are the most vulnerable and least able to threaten the party-state.
We used a case study approach, tracing the evolution of the three policies and identifying 
the factors (focussing on actors, political institutions, external shocks and ideas) that influenced 
their development and adoption (George & Bennett 2005). We identified and read key policy 
 
4Early work on particularly the Maoist period of CCP rule often focussed on top leaders and elite factional 
politics. See for example MacFarquhar (1974), Pye (1981).
 
5See http://www.gov.cn/guowuyuan/zuzhi.htm, accessed 6 December 2016; Saich (2014).
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documents and leaders’ speeches, as well as academic papers about each policy, and we also 
interviewed individuals who had been researching or interacting with government departments 
during the development of the policy. We established a chronological narrative for each 
policy case and identified contributing factors. We then developed an explanation for each 
case, before considering the cases together and whether they influenced each other or were 
influenced by wider contextual factors. We then fully evaluated competing explanations, 
especially the ‘threat of rebellion’ thesis (George & Bennett 2005, p. 91). Finally, we took our 
descriptive explanations for each case and developed them into an overarching explanation that 
captures both specific factors and key features of institutional and historical context (George 
& Bennett 2005, p. 93). It is challenging to identify actors and decisions in China because so 
many decisions take place in closed forums that do not publish written records, but we have 
pieced together our evidence with care.
The argument
Our essay argues that the threat of rebellion cannot explain the early twenty-first century 
expansion of public goods in rural China. Although rural protest was a growing problem in 
the 1990s and early 2000s, the Chinese party-state focussed on predatory local government 
activity—ad hoc fee charging—as its most important cause. Public protest was a factor in rural 
tax reforms but it was not the only one, and it was much less important in the introduction 
of new rural cooperative medical schemes (xin nongcun hezuo yiliao—NRCMS) and new 
rural pensions schemes (xin nongcun yanglao baoxian—NRPS). NRCMS and NRPS were 
adopted nationwide in the twenty-first century not because top leaders thought they would 
significantly reduce protest, but because a number of different actors—a mix of central and 
local officials, researchers, international organisations and journalists—put ideas about 
rural problems and their solutions on the agenda and then sustained and developed policy 
options through research, debate and experimentation. They did so sometimes under the 
influence of previous policies, but also persuaded by the ideas they absorbed by considering 
the experiences and policies of other countries. Top leadership consensus on adopting and—
more importantly—driving the implementation of new policies nationwide emerged when 
these policies were seen to support the wider national economic development paradigm as it 
evolved through interpretations of external shocks, most importantly: the 1997 Asian financial 
crisis, the 2003 Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) epidemic and the 2008 global 
financial crisis. Political institutions had myriad influences but most notably allowed (indeed 
encouraged) central and local officials to develop and experiment with policies.
This essay next sets out the new social policies adopted and implemented in the first decade 
of the twenty-first century. It then examines in more detail the three policies we selected for 
study and explains why each was adopted. It concludes that in theorising about authoritarian 
regimes, political scientists may need to revise assumptions about the role of ‘dictators’ and 
their motivations in policy processes.
Extending public goods to the unenfranchised in the twenty-first century
Having focussed on delivering public goods to urban residents in the 1990s, the Chinese 
party-state in the first decade of the twenty-first century introduced new social programmes 
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that extended provisions to the poorest, primarily in rural China. In late 2002, it announced 
policies to reduce the burden of arbitrary fees that local governments charged farmers and 
to introduce NRCMS (CCPCC & SC 2002a). In 2005 it then abolished agricultural tax and 
began to expand NRCMS, investing more in subsidies and setting clear targets for local 
governments to enrol voluntarily the vast majority of villagers (Brown et al. 2009). In 2006, 
it announced that all children would receive nine years of free education and began promoting 
this policy first in western and central rural areas and then nationwide.6 In 2007 the party-state 
announced that the means-tested ‘minimum livelihood guarantee’ programme (a household 
income support initiative that had operated in the cities since the 1990s) would be extended 
to the countryside (Gao & Zhai 2012). In 2009, it began a national Rural Pension Pilot 
Programme, and then extended its coverage as it rolled out NRPS nationwide, finding take-up 
much faster than anticipated.
Although it focussed on the countryside, the party-state also introduced new social security 
programmes for the urban ‘unenfranchised’. In 2007 it introduced Urban Residents’ Health 
Insurance for the non-working population in the cities who had been excluded from the 1990s 
urban employee health insurance (Lin et al. 2009). In April 2009, it then announced major 
reforms of the health system, in which it set the goal of universal access to basic health care 
by 2020 (CCPCC & SC 2009). Finally, in 2011, the party-state centre announced the pilot 
Social Pension Insurance for urban residents (Dorfman et al. 2013).
Among this list of policies to extend public goods in China’s one-party system, three of 
the most important were the reform and then abolition of agricultural tax, the introduction 
of NRCMS, and the creation of NRPS. Each of these policies was both novel and radical: 
removing farmers’ tax obligations and for the first time giving rural dwellers entitlements 
to state-subsidised provision in ill health and old age. In the sections below we set out the 
evolution of each and the particular range of key actors, political institutions, external shocks 
and ideas that put them on the agenda and then resulted in their adoption and implementation.
Reform and abolition of agricultural tax
The Chinese party-state did not tax farmers under the planned economy, but it introduced 
agricultural taxation from the early 1980s as it decollectivised farming. Taxation became a 
source of grievance in the Chinese countryside soon after it was introduced (Bernstein & Lü 
2003). But more controversial than statutory taxes were the additional fees charged by local 
government officials, sometimes to fund specific programmes as a result of policy initiatives 
from central government ministries. The resulting ‘farmers’ burden’ (nongmin fudan) of 
combined taxes and fees appeared to fuel rising rural protests in the 1990s, particularly after 
the 1994 tax reforms reduced local government revenues (Bernstein & Lü 2000; He 2000; 
Li 2006; Kennedy 2007; Zhao 2007). The central party-state was aware of the problem of 
excessive state extraction from the mid-1980s, and it was reported in the media and scholarly 
research (Bernstein & Lü 2000). In 1993 the Party Central Committee and State Council 
(CCP and SC, China’s central government cabinet) published a list of 99 fees and fundraising 
schemes imposed by 24 central ministries and commissions and at the same time criticised 
local officials for using ‘instruments and methods of dictatorship to collect money or goods’ 
 
6
‘Zhongguo jiaoyushi shang de lichengpai: quanmian shishi chengxiang mianfei yiwu jiaoyu’, Xinhuashe, 
31 July 2008, available at: http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2008-07/31/content_8867264.htm, accessed 
22 August 2013.
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from farmers (Bernstein & Lü 2000, p. 746). Reform of central–local tax-sharing in 1994 then 
exacerbated revenue problems in some areas and may have contributed to further extraction. 
From at least 1996 the centre also closely monitored the rising ‘farmers’ burden’-related 
protests, issuing circulars from 1996 to 2005 that disclosed serious incidents caused by the 
‘farmers’ burden’ in various places all over the country (Dong & Wen 2008).7
Rural tax reform was put firmly on the policy agenda in October 1998, when the State 
Council (headed since March that year by Premier Zhu Rongji) set up a working group 
led by the powerful Ministry of Finance. In April 1999 the working group recommended 
abolishing fees and increasing taxes from 3% to 7%—an attempt to prevent ad hoc fees and 
arbitrary local government predation (Xu 2004, p. 33). In February 2000 the CCP’s very top 
leaders, the Politburo Standing Committee, approved this ‘tax-for-fee’ (feigaishui) reform 
and in March the CCPCC and State Council issued a document that introduced experiments 
in the province of Anhui. Other localities resisted implementing the experiments, however, 
because of concerns that local government revenues would suffer. Some parts of the central 
bureaucracy, such as the Ministry of Education, were also concerned with the potentially 
detrimental impact on local service provision. In March 2001 the State Council ordered that 
experiments should not be extended, effectively putting a brake on the reforms (Li 2006).
In March 2002, however, seven months before Hu Jintao became Party General Secretary 
and a year before Wen Jiabao became Premier, the State Council kick-started the ‘tax-for-fee’ 
reforms again and promised fiscal transfers to compensate some localities. By the end of 
2002, the centre had extended experiments to 20 provinces, and then in March 2003 the State 
Council called for them to be adopted nationwide (SC 2003). In 2004 Premier Wen went a 
significant step further and announced that the agricultural tax rate would be reduced every 
year and completely abolished in five years. By 2005, 28 provinces had abolished agricultural 
taxes, and they formed a negligible share of government revenues nationally. The National 
People’s Congress, China’s legislature, then ruled that from 1 January 2006 agricultural tax 
was no longer payable (Pang 2012, pp. 25–7).
What explains China’s reform and abolition of agricultural tax? Protests over the farmers’ 
burden certainly played a role, but they were not the only influence (Yep 2004). China has a 
long history in which excessive burdens on farmers have led to rebellions and the collapse of 
imperial dynasties. And the CCP leadership surely wanted to prevent protest from escalating. 
Certainly the central party-state circulars indicate that protests relating to the ‘farmers’ 
burden’ were of sufficient concern to merit close monitoring, while Zhu Rongji raised them 
in an internal speech (Zhu 2011). But rural protest was targeted overwhelmingly at local 
governments rather than the centre. And at the same time, central and local government 
restrictions on freedom of association, effective measures to prevent people from organising 
collective action, and arrests of protest organisers, meant that rural protests against local state 
predation had not seemed an imminent threat to China’s authoritarian regime (Bernstein & 
Lü 2000). Finally, while monitoring began in the mid-1990s, taxes were not reformed until 
 
7The Party Central Committee Office and State Council Office published reports in 1996, 1997, 1999, 2000, 
2001, 2002 and 2005. Each one was called a ‘Notice concerning the situation of pernicious cases of farmers’ 
burden in [the previous year]’. The first was published in Hubei zhengbao, No. 7 (1996, p. 9), and the others in 
Hubei zhengbao, No. 8, (1997, pp. 25–6); Hubei zhengbao, No. 11, (1999, p. 19); Guangxi zhengbao, No. 32, 
(2000, pp. 18–9); Zhejiang zhengbao, No. 32, (2001, pp. 7–8); Zhejiang zhengbao, No. 30, (2002, pp. 14–8); 
and Neimenggu zhengbao, No. 6, (2005, pp. 29–30).
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the early 2000s after local governments blocked experiments, and so clearly protest was not 
the only factor.
Chinese ministries, scholars and the media in the rural policy community also played their 
part, by getting—and keeping—the idea of the ‘farmers’ burden’ on the agenda. The Ministry 
of Agriculture’s Rural Work Bulletin for example published an article in 1983 on the need to 
reduce the ‘farmers’ burden’ (Chen 1983, pp. 19–20). Rural policy community members then 
reported and discussed the farmers’ burden issue through the 1980s and 1990s (Bernstein 
1999). The phrase ‘farmers’ burden’ was then widely used in party-state documents relating 
to rural tax reform.
By 2002 and 2003, just as Hu and Wen came to power, the debate over tax reform began 
to intensify and some scholars argued that agricultural tax revenues were small enough to 
make even abolition affordable. When others countered that removing the tax obligations of 
approximately half of the population set a poor precedent and was itself unfair in principle, 
supporters of abolition contended that farmers—already among the poorest in the country—
were taxed much more heavily than better off urban residents and rural non-agricultural 
workers (Nongcun shuifei gaige yanjiu ketizu 2003; Sun 2003, pp. 16–8; Zhao 2003, pp. 
44–6). Finally, some argued that China’s 2001 entry into the World Trade Organization would 
harm agriculture and that it was unfair that while other countries subsidised this sector, the 
Chinese government still taxed it (Li 2002, pp. 51–5; Duan 2003, pp. 12–5).
External shocks—and their interpretation—also played a part. Influential economic policy 
actors interpreted the Asian financial crisis of 1997 as demonstrating the dangers for China’s 
economy of relying on export markets. Justin Yifu Lin, an economist and later a deputy director 
of the World Bank, for example, began to argue that relying too much on overseas markets 
created risks for the Chinese economy, and that domestic—especially rural—consumption 
needed to play a greater role in China’s growth, in turn requiring higher rural incomes and 
better social security (Lin 1999, 2003, pp. 20–1, 2005, pp. 13–5; Wang 2004; Wen et al. 
2013). These ideas were soon found in policy statements. In 1998, for example, the CCPCC, 
at a meeting that approved rural tax reforms, noted the need to develop domestic demand and 
promote rural development (CCPCC 1998). In 2002, a CCPCC and State Council document 
pushing forward rural ‘tax-for-fee’ reform argued that ‘increasing farmers’ income is not only 
concerned with … improving their lives and rural stability, it is also concerned with carrying 
out the policy of expanding domestic demand and the whole national economy’ (CCPCC & SC 
2002b, p. 1). In 2006 Minister of Finance Jin Renqing argued that the abolition of rural taxes:
… is a force to expand domestic demand [and] maintain the speedy development of the national 
economy. The countryside is a potentially massive consumer market, [and] the rural population 
concentrates our country’s most numerous and greatest latent consumer group. It is the source of our 
country’s most reliable, enduring driving force for economic growth. (Zhou 2006)
Thus for the reform and abolition of rural fees and taxes, the party-state centre appeared to 
be concerned about protest. But it initiated reform only after the external shock of the 1997 
Asian financial crisis apparently led top leaders to accept arguments linking the ‘farmers’ 
burden’ to lack of consumer power. Agricultural ‘tax-for-fee’ reform was prioritised when it 
became associated with the party-state’s wider economic development strategy, and it was 
boosted in 2002 by concerns about the impact of China’s WTO entry. Several issues and 
ideas thus converged in the late 1990s: rising levels of protest, arguments about the need for 
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domestic consumption-led economic growth and concerns about WTO membership, as well 
as policy-specific proposals from the rural policy community. Top leader Zhu Rongji himself 
seems to have made a difference, too, acting decisively on fiscal reforms perhaps because 
the 1997 crisis hit China just as he became Premier. Local leader Hui Liangyu played an 
important role by sustaining experiments that allowed the policy to develop until China’s 
economy recovered from the crisis and central subsidies were seen as affordable (Pang 2012). 
The Hu–Wen leadership appears to have been persuaded by policy community arguments 
that abolishing agricultural tax was affordable as well as contributing to social stability and 
economic growth. In this it was helped by agricultural tax’s decline from 4% of government 
revenues in 1998 to less than 1% in 2004 (He et al. 2004).
New rural cooperative medical schemes
Unequal urban–rural health insurance provision dated back to the pre-reform Mao era, 
when state enterprises paid for much of their workers’ relatively high quality health care 
while rural cooperative medical schemes, introduced from the late 1950s, funded villagers’ 
medical treatment much less generously. Then from the early 1980s, even the very basic 
rural cooperative schemes were allowed to collapse—with only an estimated 5% of villages 
retaining them by 1984 (Duckett 2011).
The possibility of re-establishing cooperative medical schemes, or some form of rural 
health insurance, was explored again from the late 1980s through Ministry of Health projects 
with international organisations. From 1985 to 1993 the Ministry of Health, in collaboration 
with the Rand Corporation, researched rural health insurance in two counties in Sichuan. In 
1987 the Ministry of Health and Anhui Medical University jointly researched rural cooperative 
medical and health systems. From 1988 the Ministry of Health’s Policy and Management 
Research Experts Committee carried out research on rural health that established the basis 
for cooperative medical schemes reform (Cai 2009). In 1993 the Ministry of Health, with the 
backing of UNICEF, began a ‘7-year applied policy study on provision and financing of health 
care for the rural poor’ (Liu et al. 2002, p. 4). Through the 1990s the Ministry of Health was 
also involved in collaborative projects with Chinese and foreign researchers, international 
organisations such as the World Health Organization, the World Bank, the United Kingdom 
government’s Department for International Development, The Rockefeller Foundation and 
the Asian Development Bank. These projects experimented with different policy options and 
demonstrated that large numbers of rural dwellers in China were becoming impoverished by 
the high costs of their health care because they had no health insurance (Liu & Rao 2006).
Amid all this research activity, voluntary cooperative medical schemes (involving villager 
contributions but no state funding) rose up the central party-state’s policy agenda. In 1991, 
Premier Li Peng backed cooperative medical schemes, and then in 1993, a State Council 
Research Office study concluded that the government should support the ‘revitalisation’ 
of cooperative medical schemes. In 1996, Jiang Zemin backed it, and in 1997 a CCPCC 
and State Council Decision on cooperative medical schemes set a target of establishing 
voluntary cooperative schemes across rural areas by 2000 and announced local experiments 
(CCPCC & SC 1997). Despite this central party-state decision, however, efforts to extend risk 
protection failed in the 1990s because voluntary contributions conflicted with central party-
state directives aimed at stopping local governments charging ad hoc fees to rural residents 
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(Zhang et al. 2014). Although high on the agenda, it was not high enough for the party-state 
centre to put weight behind financing or driving implementation nationwide.
Again in 2002, however, Jiang Zemin lent support to cooperative medical schemes, and 
again a Party Central Committee and State Council Decision announced experiments (Liu 
& Rao 2006). This ‘new’ rural cooperative medical system involved county government-
organised schemes to fund people’s health care costs from contributions by households and 
government. It differed from its predecessors in part because it was backed with central 
government subsidies to poorer localities, and crucially, because the central party-state 
created a system of coordinating committees to implement the schemes (Manuel 2016). 
Experimentation (2003–2005) focussed on refining the policy and overcame concerns about 
local embezzlement of centrally transferred funds (Zhang et al. 2014). The programme was 
rolled out nationally in 2006.
What then explains the eventual adoption of NRCMS? It was not due to protest—in fact 
cooperative medical schemes were hindered in the 1990s because contributions were associated 
with ‘predatory’ local government fee charging. (For this reason, the party-state centre was 
unwilling to make cooperative medical schemes mandatory as health specialists advised.) 
Instead, cooperative medical schemes and rural health insurance (both were explored in the 
1980s and 1990s) were put on the agenda in part by a health policy community comprising 
the Ministry of Health, international organisations, and domestic and foreign researchers. 
With Mao-era cooperative medical schemes a precedent, they could argue that some form 
of rural health scheme was both feasible and necessary. This was sufficient to get top leader 
Jiang Zemin’s backing and a party-centre decision on cooperative medical schemes in 1997, 
but not enough to secure implementation or funding—at least until 2002.
The party-state issued a second Decision in 2002—again with the backing of Jiang 
Zemin—in part because external shocks pushed rural health up the agenda. Top leaders had 
been embarrassed in 2000 by China’s low ranking (188 out of 191 nations) in a World Health 
Organization international league table that compared ‘the fairness in financial contribution’ 
of health systems across the globe (WHO 2000; Wang 2008, pp. 128, 130). The low ranking 
was in large part because most rural dwellers paid ‘out of pocket’ for their health care. It 
was a shock for top leaders because in the past China had received much praise for its health 
system, including the 1970s rural cooperative schemes (Zhang et al. 2014).
At the same time, officials and researchers helped to keep cooperative medical schemes 
on the agenda by arguing that inadequate health protection was contributing to rural 
impoverishment (Liu & Rao 2006; Wang 2008, pp. 128, 130). China’s leaders were keen to 
maintain their international reputation for tackling poverty, and were concerned about falling 
rural incomes after 1998. Also as we have seen, members of the economic policy community 
had begun to argue that rural domestic demand—limited by low incomes—was important for 
balanced growth (CCPCC 1998). Health researchers’ evidence on the health system causes 
of rural deprivation therefore helped portray cooperative medical schemes as solving not just 
a health problem but also wider poverty and economic problems.
Central party-state consensus on the importance of cooperative medical schemes might 
nevertheless have been difficult to sustain had it not been for the SARS epidemic that spread 
across China and then beyond its borders from late 2002 to mid-2003. The SARS crisis 
thrust China’s problem-stricken health system into the national and international spotlight, 
and revealed the dangers of poor health risk protection: rural dwellers afraid to seek costly 
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diagnosis and care, and an epidemic out of control. SARS struck just as Hu and Wen took 
over as top leaders from Jiang and Zhu. Had they been unable to contain the disease, their 
leadership—and perhaps CCP rule itself—might have been in question. Thus, although the 
epidemic was, by summer 2003, brought under control, it meant the gap between rural and 
urban health provision remained high on the Hu–Wen policy agenda (Duckett 2011). Whether 
Hu and Wen would otherwise have pushed through NRCMS implementation we do not know. 
It was before this (in January 2003) that the party centre set up coordinating committees to 
drive implementation, but large-scale experimentation and nationwide adoption came later.
NRCMS was developed through the activities and ideas generated by the health policy 
community. And as with agricultural tax reform, it was when NRCMS was interpreted as 
helping solve problems created by external shocks and contributing to wider economic 
development strategy that the party-state centre prioritised it for national implementation. 
The role of leaders in this policy was not straightforward: although top leader Li Peng backed 
cooperative medical schemes in 1991, and then Jiang Zemin backed them in 1996 and again 
in 2002, Premier Zhu Rongji’s concern with economic reform and fiscal policy apparently 
won out in the 1990s. Hu and Wen clearly backed NRCMS after SARS, but may have acted 
more decisively because the epidemic had put health policy centre stage for the first time in 
the post-Mao period.
New rural pension schemes
Unlike the many urban residents who had enjoyed employer pensions introduced from the 
1950s, China’s rural dwellers had never had access to pension schemes. Instead, they had 
relied in old age on their families and, failing that, basic assistance from rural collectives. 
Schemes began to appear in the mid-1980s, however, when according to Tony Saich in 
the absence of central government direction, ‘rural localities began to experiment with new 
forms of old-age provision and these were pulled together by the Ministry of Civil Affairs’ 
(Saich 2008, p. 154). This Ministry then ‘won approval’ to experiment with rural pensions 
and proposed testing six models across five provinces. In 1991, it set up a Temporary Office 
for Rural Social Insurance Pensions and extended experimentation to over 1,000 counties by 
late 1992 (Saich 2008).
Experimentation with rural pensions continued through the 1990s and covered 82 million 
farmers nationwide by 1998 (Saich 2008). But as with the rural cooperative medical schemes 
at the time, most of these ‘old rural pensions schemes’ were voluntary and received no 
government funding. As a result, they tended to attract only the well-off rural dwellers 
and failed to enrol a significant proportion of the rural population. Because they involved 
local officials collecting contributions from rural dwellers they—like cooperative medical 
schemes—conflicted with the Ministry of Agriculture’s efforts to reduce local government 
fees and the ‘farmers’ burden’ (Wang 2008, pp. 128, 130). Indeed, Zhu Rongji, after the 
Asian financial crisis, blocked pension reform as he launched a ‘rectification’ of the insurance 
industry, apparently concerned about corruption, financial mismanagement and the fiscal risks 
of having to bail out failed programmes (Saich 2008, p. 155).
In autumn 2002, however, with local ‘tax-for-fee’ reform now almost completed and 
fees abolished, the CCP’s 16th Party Congress proposed ‘exploring and creating’ a rural 
old-age care insurance system. The Rural Social Security Division of Ministry of Labour 
and Social Security (laodong he shehui baozhang bu—MoLSS)—since 1998 charged with 
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rural pensions—pushed forward experiments. As with NRCMS, although the government 
approved experimentation, it was not yet fully committed to the initiative. Instead, it allowed 
exploration, discussion and testing of different possible models to assess their viability and 
cost (MoLSS Research Group 2007, p. 1).
Members of the rural policy community—government officials as well as researchers—
meanwhile debated whether rural pensions should be set up nationwide. Some made the 
longstanding argument that rural dwellers had land and could rely on their children for old-age 
care, so that the government has no need or responsibility to create a pension scheme for them. 
Others contended that the government had not even been able to provide good urban pensions, 
let alone create schemes for rural dwellers. Even those who supported the introduction of 
national rural pension schemes in principle questioned whether the timing was right when 
China still had so many farmers. A 2002 ADB report, however, supported rural pensions, 
arguing that some European countries had introduced rural old-age insurance at similar or 
even earlier stages of development (Saich 2008, p. 157). Others pointed out that agriculture 
was only 14% of GDP and China’s GDP per capita was now high enough to make pensions 
viable (Chen 2004, pp. 20–2).
In November 2003 the policy received a boost after a Central United Front Department 
delegation reported to (then) Vice–Premier Hui Liangyu that new rural pensions were ‘feasible’ 
and might serve to ‘ease potential social conflicts and promote rural social stability’ (MoLSS 
2003). Premier Wen Jiabao then in turn expressed cautious support for further ‘exploring’ 
the initiative locally (Zou 2008, pp. 92–5). The Rural Social Security Department of MoLSS 
seized the opportunity created by Premier Wen’s support and pushed for localities to set up the 
schemes. But despite Wen’s backing for it, the United Front Department delegation linking it 
to the issue of social unrest and MoLSS encouraging it, the scheme was not yet given backing 
for nationwide implementation.
At this stage, a research project funded by the Japan International Cooperation Agency 
(JICA) played an important role. Partnered with MoLSS (which, in 2008, became the Ministry 
of Human Resources and Social Security (renli ziyuan he shehui baozhang bu—MoHRSS)) 
and running from 2006 to 2008, the project examined schemes in eight counties across seven 
provinces.8 It concluded with a workshop attended by officials from not only the MoHRSS 
itself and the HRSS departments of 20 provinces, but also the National Development and 
Reform Commission, the Ministry of Finance and China’s central bank. This workshop was 
followed by other meetings, and led to further local experimentation in 464 counties (Tong 
2009, p. 1).
The central party-state then moved quickly, in June 2009 approving the MoHRSS’s rural 
pension programme and announcing pilot implementation in 10% of counties across the 
country. The State Council now set a target of including all eligible rural residents by 2020 
(SC 2009). Take-up and implementation, however, dramatically exceeded expectations and the 
programme had been adopted nationwide by the end of 2012 (Wen 2012a, p. 3). Once central 
leaders were behind the scheme and approved government funding for it,9 local governments 
 
8
‘Zhong Ri hezuo nongcun shehui yanglao boaxian xiangmu zai Jing qidong’, Xinhuanet, 15 February 2006, 
available at: http://news.xinhuanet.com/society/2006-02/15/content_4184945.htm, accessed 12 June 2014.
 
9The central government fully subsidised basic pensions in middle and western provinces and funded 50% 
for eastern provinces. Local governments also subsidised farmers’ personal contributions.
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were more willing to implement it—helped by the fact that implementing rural pension 
reform experiments was made important in the performance evaluations of local leaders. The 
threshold payments for joining the scheme were modest—at 100 yuan a year for the lowest 
level—so that even rural residents in poor areas could afford to join (SC 2009; Lu 2010). 
And because local governments matched personal contributions, the scheme was not seen as 
a form of state predation.
What then explains the adoption of NRPS? Although an official report had linked it to ‘social 
stability’—in other words, preventing social unrest—there is scant evidence that the absence 
of rural pensions was contributing to rural protest. Perhaps the United Front Department 
delegation thought that introducing pensions would contribute to easing more general rural 
discontent. Or perhaps it used the threat of instability to secure support for a policy it backed 
for other reasons. Certainly, if the threat of protest did play a role in introducing NRPS, it 
was not a central one, though in the middle of the first decade of the twenty-first century 
MoLSS (2006) did encourage local governments to enrol rural dwellers who had lost their 
land in existing pension schemes (urban or rural) so as to reduce dissatisfaction and potential 
instability.
Rural pension policy was put on the agenda by local governments, soon with the support 
of the MoCA, and then nurtured through experimentation and research that sometimes 
involved international organisations. Perhaps the debate over rural pensions in the policy 
community meant that the need for pensions was less clearly articulated in the early 2000s. 
As with NRCMS, it was only when it was interpreted as helping solve problems (revealed by 
external shocks) and contributing to the wider national development strategy that the party-
state centre prioritised pensions policy for national implementation. The need to stimulate 
domestic demand, an idea that had begun to gain credence from the late 1990s, became even 
more prominent after the global financial crisis of 2008 once again hit China’s exports. Top 
leaders soon began to link pensions to increasing rural consumption. As Premier Wen Jiabao 
noted at the launch meeting of the new rural pension pilot scheme in 2009:
against the background of the current financial crisis, a signal is sent to rural dwellers that the 
government will create a full-payment minimum basic pension for millions in the countryside, who 
will enjoy old-age care. Without fear of trouble in their life, they will dare to consume and spend more, 
which will produce a strong and durable drive for promoting rural markets and enlarging domestic 
consumption demand. (Wen 2009, p. 2)
NRPS was also increasingly seen as helping deal with another national economic development 
problem: China’s ageing population. The party-state set up a Commission on Ageing as early 
as 1999, and through the 2000s the sense of crisis grew over care for the elderly due to China’s 
one-child policy and the outward migration of young people from the countryside (Zeng 2001, 
pp. 3–9; Zhu 2012, pp. 42–3). Arguments about the need to tackle this crisis were sustained 
not only by parts of the bureaucracy (the Rural Social Security Department of the MoLSS/
MoHRSS) with an interest in expanding provision, but also by researchers and foreign aid 
agencies (such as the JICA) who together kept it on the policy agenda with joint projects.
Overall, then, local governments and the rural policy community generated ideas and 
then experimented with policy options that were gradually seen as solutions to not only rural 
but also national economic and social problems as members of China’s economic policy 
community interpreted external shocks like the 2008 global financial crisis. China’s top leaders 
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played a significant role—both negatively and positively—in NRPS. In the late 1990s, Premier 
Zhu Rongji blocked and ‘rectified’ rural pensions because they conflicted with rural tax, 
finance and insurance policies that were pushed up the agenda when the Asian financial crisis 
focussed attention on the fiscal as well as political risks of rural local government financial 
mismanagement and predation. He was apparently uninterested in rural social security, stating 
at the end of his term as Premier in 2003 that social security reform had been basically achieved 
(Zhu 2002). Hu and Wen, however, went on to develop rural social security as their ‘new 
socialist countryside’ agenda developed from NRCMS through to pensions.
Explaining authoritarian public goods provision: beyond the ‘threat of rebellion’
We do not claim that the expansion of public goods under Hu and Wen removed inequalities 
and transformed Chinese society. Indeed, there were many limitations to the policies adopted, 
many problems implementing them, and their outcomes have been mixed. The abolition of 
rural taxes, for example, has not been fully compensated for by fiscal transfers. It has therefore 
reduced local government funding and in some localities has hit spending on education, 
health and social services (Liu et al. 2009). NRCMS, while it has successfully enrolled the 
vast majority of China’s rural population, is under-funded and unable to pay for costly care. 
Rural pensions are meagre in comparison with those of many urban residents. Nevertheless, 
the expansion of public goods to rural areas has aided many families and has established the 
principle of universal entitlement to basic provision for the first time since 1949—even if 
‘basic’ has not been defined. Provisions and government spending on these programmes has 
grown since they were extended nationwide.
It is also important to understand that in expanding provision in the early twenty-
first century, China’s central party-state benefitted from an enabling economic and fiscal 
environment. As Peter John (2012) has noted in other policy contexts, budgetary concerns 
often constrain the space for policy options. But equally, budgetary confidence may inspire 
generosity. So when the Chinese economy had recovered from the effects of the late 1990s 
Asian financial crisis, and revenues grew, the party-state found itself in a better position to 
subsidise programmes, especially in poorer parts of the country (Brys et al. 2013). Government 
revenue in 2001 surged by 22%, the highest rate since 1993 (Zhu, 2002),10 and in 2002 
the central party-state announced funding compensation for ‘tax-for-fee’ reform as well as 
government spending of NRCMS.11
Although we challenge ‘threat of rebellion’ explanations of China’s twenty-first century 
public goods provision, we do not argue that Chinese leaders are unconcerned by challengers. 
The central party-state certainly was (and remains) very concerned about threats to its 
rule, and as many others have shown, uses a range of increasingly sophisticated methods 
to identify dissatisfaction, pre-empt and suppress protest in both urban and rural areas, 
emasculate any opposition and shut down criticism. But not all China’s policies are aimed 
directly at maintaining its one-party rule. Each year China’s party-state issues hundreds of 
policy documents, from high level decrees to more detailed rules, across the whole range 
10
‘National Government Revenue and Expenditure and Their Increase Rates’, National Bureau of Statistics of 
China, 2016, available at: http://data.stats.gov.cn/english/easyquery.htm?cn=C01, accessed 18 September 2016.
11Interview with a leading Chinese rural researcher, Beijing, 14 September 2013.
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of government areas, from foreign affairs, the economy, banking, trade, energy, science and 
technology, through to cultural affairs, education, population, infrastructure investment, 
forestry management, environment, irrigation, social security and health. While some of 
these policies (and other decisions) help sustain CCP rule by preferentially benefitting its 
core elite, many others do not.
In our specific case studies, we show that the party-state monitored rising protest in the 
post-Mao period, and in the 1990s and early 2000s it interpreted rural protest as catalysed by 
local government predation, especially fee extraction. The ‘threat of rebellion’ therefore was 
a factor in the calculations of top leaders when they reformed the rural tax system, though it 
was only one among several. It was an even less important factor in relation to rural health 
and pensions reforms. Official documents sometimes noted that these policies contributed 
to maintaining ‘social stability’, but there is no evidence that leaders perceived protest to be 
fuelled by demands for health schemes or pensions (O’Brien 2009, pp. 25–9; Saich 2014). 
When in the 2000s local government land grabs started to generate protest, the State Council 
did, however, encourage local governments to ensure that rural dwellers who had lost their 
land had access to existing social security provisions (MoLSS 2006).
As well as top leaders, we show the influence of actors usually excluded from authoritarian 
regime theories that focus on individual dictators. We reveal how—even if they are 
bureaucratically dominated—policy communities can be influential in autocracies. China’s 
ministries, local governments, journalists, academic researchers, and the domestic and 
international organisations they were working with put rural social policies on the agenda, 
and developed policy ideas and options through debates, research and experimentation.
In discussing the influence of these actors, we emphasise the importance of policy ideas in 
public goods provision. Ideas are now well established as policy influences in democracies, 
but remain neglected in authoritarian theory, even though other comparative work has 
acknowledged their influence—at least in communist regimes. Stephan Haggard and Robert 
Kaufman for example have noted that ‘Communist regimes radically redistributed resources 
not because of their responsiveness to underlying social pressures, but because of political and 
ideological commitments to a socialist transformation’ (Haggard & Kaufman 2008, p. 357). 
Similarly, Michael Miller has acknowledged that ‘Communist regimes have highly distinct 
policy platforms’ (M. K. Miller 2015, p. 1543). But instead of incorporating the influence of 
ideas into authoritarian public goods provision, some have dismissed ‘communist regimes’ 
as exceptions or even excluded them from its models (Acemoglu & Robinson 2001, p. 939).
We are able to show that specific policy ideas are connected to the CCP’s wider claims to 
rule and that neither should be ignored. The ideas and options developed by specific policy 
communities—around rural or health policy for example—were much more likely to rise up 
the policy agenda when they offered solutions to economic problems. This is because there has 
been an elite consensus through the post-Mao period that promoting economic development 
is high priority (Naughton 2015, p. 165). Top leaders and the wider party-state centre (the 
Party Central Committee, State Council and ministries) have informally staked the CCP’s 
claims to rule—its legitimacy—on its ability to deliver national economic growth. Hu and 
Wen extended those claims to rule by incorporating social development into the national 
agenda (Holbig 2009). China’s top leaders apparently fear not just threats by distinct groups 
of challengers, but a more diffuse undermining of their legitimacy and this has encouraged 
them to support policy innovation in tandem with continually evolving their claims to rule.
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External shocks have long been seen as important in democratic policy making but also 
remain excluded from analyses of authoritarian public goods provision. We show that ideas 
about the Asian financial and global crises and solutions to them were important in developing 
not only economic but also social policy. Another external shock, the 2003 SARS crisis, played 
a role, particularly for NRCMS but also for other social policies, by showing the dangers of 
their neglect. It appears to have transformed the Hu and Wen leadership’s views on national 
development—encouraging them to see not only economic but also social development as 
important. Talking about the influence of the SARS crisis on the government, Wen has said, 
for example, that ‘[d]uring the fight against SARS in 2003 we received much enlightened 
guidance, among which the most important was that it is necessary to plan economic and 
social development as a whole’ to enable balance between the two (Wen 2010).
Finally, political institutions also played a role in the expansion of public goods, though 
not in the way that theories of authoritarianism anticipate. Authoritarian regime theories are 
institutional in the sense that they see autocratic institutions as having distinctive effects on 
politics—including public policies and resultant public goods provision. With their focus on 
dictators, however, they tend to assume that institutions play a certain role—for example by 
making those dictators sensitive to the demands of their narrow ‘selectorate’, and insulating 
them from the demands of wider society. While political institutions in China did indeed limit 
the influence of rural dwellers and other civil society actors, they also had other effects, notably 
shaping the access of bureaucratically dominated policy communities and incentivising them 
to generate new policy ideas and options.
Our study focuses on only one authoritarian regime: one with a communist party in 
power and an extensive bureaucracy. This might put it in a sub-group of communist or other 
authoritarian states. And China may be unusual in its longevity, in its people’s strong sense of 
nation, and in having been mostly spared from the ravages of colonialism. These factors may 
have contributed uniquely to shaping its institutions and giving bureaucratically dominated 
policy communities and their policy ideas influence in public goods provision. As a result, our 
arguments may be limited to China itself. We think this is unlikely, but we are more interested 
in explaining political and policy outcomes than in categorising the Chinese political system. 
Having demonstrated the importance of policy communities, external shocks and ideas in such 
outcomes in one authoritarian regime, we encourage others to explore their influence in others.
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